



**BUSINESS**at**OECD**

Business and Industry Advisory  
Committee to the OECD

# **Towards a More Coherent and Competitive Export Finance Framework**

Business Priorities for the Future of the  
OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits

Priorities Paper  
**June 2026**

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# Executive Summary

The OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits has been a cornerstone of the rules-based international trade and finance system for nearly five decades, helping ensure that competition among exporters is based on the quality and price of goods and services rather than on subsidised financing terms. However, the global landscape for official finance has evolved significantly. The growing role of non-Participants, the proliferation of state-backed financial instruments outside the Arrangement<sup>1</sup>, and the emergence of new digital and service-based business models have challenged the Arrangement's ability to keep pace with evolving market realities. As a result, businesses based in OECD economies increasingly face unfair competition and structural disadvantages in international markets.

Against this backdrop, *Business at OECD* calls for a targeted modernisation of the OECD Arrangement to restore its core purpose as a practicable, competitive, and comprehensive framework governing official support for cross-border trade-related finance. Priorities include revising financing terms to better reflect today's risk environment, particularly by increasing the maximum support up to 95% of the exported content and extending local costs coverage up to 100% of the exported content in high-risk markets, so that exporters can remain competitive while supporting viable projects in emerging and developing economies. An improved support to sustainable projects, being green or social, through reduced premiums or enlarged repayment periods should also be considered. At the same time, the Arrangement must evolve beyond its traditional focus on physical goods for an individual project to accommodate software-, service-, and digital-based business models, which now represent a growing share of global value creation but remain difficult to support under existing rules, as well as recognise at corporate

level: procurement needs, financing strategies and flexible or innovative requests of borrowers.

We also emphasise the need for stronger policy cooperation across official finance instruments. Better alignment between export credits, development finance, and tied aid, along with enhanced cooperation among ECAs, DFIs, and IFIs, would reduce fragmentation, lower transaction costs, and help mobilise private capital while safeguarding a level playing field.

Procedural reforms are equally important: more effective transparency requirements for non-Arrangement products, operable and timely matching provisions, and streamlined approval processes are essential to ensure that the Arrangement can respond to fast-moving competitive pressures. Finally, environmental and social due diligence procedures should remain robust but become more proportionate and standardised, enabling faster and not overburdensome deployment of green and transformative technologies and improving the competitiveness of OECD based companies in smaller transactions, and corporate ones, recurring business relationships and low-risk projects. It is also essential that the OECD Arrangement sets out environmental and social due diligence procedures that both support the competitiveness of exporters—through predictable, timely, and proportionate processes—and remain fully aligned with evolving corporate sustainability frameworks. We recommend that a risk-based approach which fast-tracks environmental and social due diligence procedures for low-risk projects be considered, which would also minimise major delays, costs and provide greater certainty to the market.

Taken together, these reforms would help ensure that the OECD Arrangement remains a credible, adaptable, and competitive multilateral framework for businesses in a rapidly changing global economy.

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<sup>1</sup> Industrial subsidies reach highest levels since the global financial crisis, says OECD (OECD MAGIC Database of Industrial Subsidies).

# Introduction

The OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (“the Arrangement”), in effect since 1978, aims to foster a level playing field in the terms of export credits offered by Export Credit Agencies (ECAs). For years, the Arrangement has provided the essential knowledge that competition amongst exporters is based on the quality and price of goods and services, rather than on the favourability of the terms and conditions of accompanying financial support.

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***The Arrangement is an important tool in creating a level playing field in international markets.***

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The Arrangement does not operate in isolation, but as part of a wider rules-based system built in the past 60 years by the international finance community. This system includes both development finance and export finance, and includes institutions such as the IMF, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the OECD, the Paris Club, and the WTO. The system is meant to ensure an orderly functioning of international markets.

Today, however, unfair competition in the financing of exports is a reality facing many businesses based in OECD economies. Major global players that are not bound by the Arrangement often provide export financing on terms that fall outside the constraints of the relatively strict disciplines established by the Arrangement. Furthermore, the financial instruments have changed over time, and export support can now take many forms: tied aid, blended finance, state-backed investment funds, and opaque credit lines through state-owned banks. To the extent that the current framework does not capture and regulate these actors or new tools, the OECD

Arrangement no longer reflects the realities of global trade.

*Business at OECD* therefore welcomes the Participants’ continuous efforts to reduce the complexity and increase the attractiveness of the OECD Arrangement and ensure it can continue as a vital multilateral tool. In our view, any future modernisation of the OECD Arrangement should aim to:

- **Promote a global level playing field**, by updating the rules to better reflect current practices, and/or expanding participation to include more countries.
- **Incorporate the full range of modern export support tools**, not just traditional buyer’s credits and supplier’s credits.
- **Enhance transparency globally**, through incentives or mechanisms for broader disclosures of official financing support.
- **Refine how the principles of good governance are applied in practice**, ensuring they remain integral to export credits policies, but also practical in competitive contexts.
- **Be adaptable to changing realities in international markets**, including new products and business models.

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***There is a need to restore the core purpose of the OECD Arrangement as a practicable set of rules for all official support for cross-border trade-related finance.***

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The OECD’s Export Credits Consultation with Civil Society Organisations on 15 June 2026 is a good first step to address the competitive distortions to global trade and restore the core purpose of the Arrangement as a practicable set of rules for all official support for cross-border trade-related finance. In this paper, we highlight a number of specific issues that currently hamper the effective functioning of the Arrangement from a private sector perspective, and recommendations to resolve them.

# Business Priorities

## Revise the Arrangement's Financing Terms and Conditions

The Arrangement's financing terms and conditions, originally designed for traditional export credits, must continue to evolve to enable businesses to compete on the merits of their products and services, while maintaining the predictability and safeguards that public export finance is intended to provide.

### *Increasing official support to the exported content*

A primary concern for businesses operating in high-risk markets is that limited access to financing can prevent them from competing effectively on large-scale government projects, such as infrastructure, energy, or healthcare projects, which frequently involve substantial upfront costs that governments in countries with higher political or commercial risk (in categories 5-7) cannot easily assume. In these countries, private lenders are often unwilling to provide the necessary capital, leaving exporters unable to pursue contracts despite strong demand and long-term strategic opportunities. Allowing export financing of up to 95% of the "export contract" (in the sense of exported value) would mitigate this barrier, enabling businesses to maintain market presence, secure large-scale projects, and build enduring relationships in regions that are important for future growth.

For businesses, this adjustment would enhance competitiveness in high-risk markets, as companies would be able to offer more attractive financing terms without increasing their own commercial exposure. It would also ensure that the projects remain viable and can proceed despite cash constraints on the part of the borrower, thereby supporting long-term trade relationships and contributing to development outcomes. Furthermore, it could

allow ECAs to expand their intervention and support to exporters.

Moreover, high financing coverage signals project viability to private investors and development finance institutions, attracting additional capital and amplifying the impact of the projects. It also allows exporters to engage confidently in long-term opportunities without prematurely exiting the market due to risk concerns. In this way, near-full financing could help sustain exports in high-risk but strategically important markets, increasing the relevance of the Arrangement.

Specifically, we call on governments to change the Article 11c) of the Arrangement as follows: The Participants shall not provide official support in excess of 95% of the export contract value, including third country supply but excluding local costs while maintaining unchanged the Article 11 a).

### *Extending local costs coverage*

A related issue is that the current treatment of local costs in low- and middle-income countries (the so-called Category II countries pursuant to Article 11 of the Arrangement and in accordance with the definition of the World Bank) does not fully reflect the financial realities faced by exporters and their government buyers. Many projects require significant local expenditure for labour, materials, or subcontracts which cannot always be financed through traditional commercial channels in these countries. Limiting coverage of local costs constrains project feasibility, discourages exporters from bidding, and reduces the overall scale and impact of supported projects. Amending the Arrangement to allow improved support to local costs up to 100% of the contract value in Category II countries would enable higher financing coverage for these essential expenditures, making projects more viable, encouraging greater participation from exporters, and ultimately increasing the total volume of trade supported in high-risk markets while maintaining prudent risk

management. In addition, it would not discriminate Local Costs versus Third Countries Costs as the present text does. Specifically, we call on the Participants to consider a long-term change of Article 11d) in the Arrangement: The Participants may provide official support for local costs, under the following conditions: 1) The maximum amount of official support for local costs shall not exceed:

– For Category I countries, 50% of the export contract value.

– For Category II countries, 100% of the export contract value.

### *Improving other terms and conditions for sustainable projects*

The Arrangement offers improved terms with larger repayment periods for some Sustainable Projects which are listed in the Climate Change Sector Understanding (CCSU). Some ECAs already grant an improved support to Social Projects beyond the CCSU which focuses on green projects and water projects. Enlarging the list of Sustainable Projects to all Green and Social Projects as defined within the Principles issued by the Loan Market Association (LMA), the Asia Pacific Loan Market Association (APLMA) and the Loan Syndication and Trade Association (LSTA) or the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) would make more visible the commitment of the ECAs towards a better world.

The Modernisation Phase I has made possible to enlarge repayment periods (up to 15 years for standard projects and up to 22 years for CCSU and NSU projects). Recent data show that these enlarged durations are more and more used. Allowing all Sustainable projects (including social projects) to benefit of larger repayment periods up to 22 years) will make their repayment more affordable for buyers.

Considering reduced premiums for all Sustainable Projects would be another tool to better support them. As requested by the WTO, ECAs have to cover alone all their costs with their risk premium over a long-term

economic cycle. The Cash-Flow data published by the OED show that since 2009, charged premiums (SDR 87.9 bn) have covered by far all their claims (SDR 44.9 bn) and operating charges (SDR 13.5 bn), before any recovery (which have represented 77% of the paid claims). With a 30% reduction in premium, their activity would have remained “profitable” before any recovery. Granting a 15% reduction of premium for Sustainable Projects would not endanger this equilibrium and would be a positive signal given by ECAs to these projects.

### *Extending the scope of the Arrangement to new business models*

To remain relevant in a rapidly changing global economy, the Arrangement must also evolve beyond its traditional focus on single projects and/or physical exports and explicitly accommodate software based and service-oriented business models that increasingly characterise international trade.

The day-to-day business of exporters provides a strong case for a further evolution of the Arrangement towards greater flexibility. Global value creation is steadily moving away from the classic model of exporting physical goods produced in OECD high income countries and towards new business models that combine hardware, software and services or, increasingly, rely predominantly on software solutions alone.

Software-based business models fundamentally challenge the traditional export paradigm underlying the Arrangement. Cloud-based solutions, licensing models, pay-per-use and pay-as-you-earn structures and “as a service” offerings are not necessarily linked to a physical cross-border shipment of goods. Instead, software is made available across borders via digital means, often hosted centrally and executed locally by the customer. In such cases, the cross-border element may consist solely of the contractual relationship rather than a tangible export transaction.

These business models are currently difficult, if not impossible, to support under the existing rules of the Arrangement. Financing structures based on recurring payments, discontinuous or usage dependent cash flows, rights of use instead of ownership, and service-based product offerings do not fit easily into the framework designed for one off capital goods exports with fixed repayment schedules. Yet, these models are becoming the norm in many sectors and are critical to maintaining the international competitiveness of OECD based companies.

Importantly, the absence of a physical export does not eliminate risk. Long term contractual relationships for software and digital services remain exposed to political, economic and regulatory risks in the buyer's country. Disruptions to payment flows, restrictions on data or service provision, or broader market interventions can have material financial consequences for exporters. From a risk perspective, these transactions therefore warrant consideration under official export credit support frameworks, even if their structure differs from traditional goods exports.

Addressing these developments will require modernised Arrangement rules that provide greater structural flexibility. This includes, inter alia, more adaptable repayment models, openness to residual values, enhanced support for local costs and non-physical exported value, and a reconsideration of how maximum financing tenors are defined for service- and software-based transactions. The growing impact of artificial intelligence and digitalisation on global business models further increases the urgency of this discussion, as insufficiently adapted rules risk creating market distortions and limiting fair, guided competition.

Against this background, *Business at OECD* calls on Participants to actively consider how the Arrangement can be expanded to adequately cover trade flows of services in addition to trade flows of goods. The Participants should take a leading role in shaping a framework that supports, rather than lags behind new business models. As a

first step, this could include structured dialogue formats, such as dedicated workshops with key stakeholders from industry, finance and policy, to develop practical and forward-looking solutions.

## **Revise the Arrangement's Treatment of Tied Aid to Improve Policy Coherence of Official Finance Instruments**

In an increasingly complex global financing landscape, strengthening policy coherence across official finance is essential to ensure public support operates in a complementary and predictable way. A more aligned approach would support both commercial objectives while reinforcing broader goals of promoting economic growth and development in emerging markets and developing economies.

### *Aligning development finance and export credits*

As a priority, businesses would like to engage in discussions of how export credits can serve their primary objective of supporting international trade, while also contributing more effectively to development outcomes in emerging and developing markets. A more harmonised approach on concessional financing is needed. Development finance could help structure transactions that are both commercially viable and aligned with local needs, enabling companies to expand into new markets while supporting sustainable growth.

Today, companies often face roadblock situations with national Participants on sustainable lending requirements and limitations, while customers are requesting OECD exporters for technical solutions plus long-term OECD funding. There are differing eligibility criteria, timelines, and compliance requirements across these instruments, even when pursuing the same project, leading to

higher transaction costs and uncertainty. This fragmentation can delay deals or make otherwise viable projects uncompetitive against rivals backed by more integrated financing systems. Aligning these frameworks would streamline access to support, improve predictability, and enable firms to compete on the basis of quality and innovation rather than on the complexity of navigating public finance systems.

Effective coordination between DFIs and ECAs is also critical in this regard, with harmonised processes and ready-to-sign collaboration schemes enabling general-purpose lending where strategic objectives exist. In addition, internal approval processes and post-disbursement reporting within DFIs and ECAs must be streamlined. Lengthy, unpredictable approval timelines and burdensome reporting make it difficult for private partners to plan and fully leverage available financing, limiting the impact of public funds.

At the same time, financing and in particular environmental and social due diligence procedures under the Common Approaches should move beyond the conventional project-based model and adopt broader, more flexible corporate financial solutions which support the financing of regional programs, sectoral initiatives, and/or corporate-level underlying with a general corporate purpose approach. This flexibility would allow capital to be deployed proactively, rather than reactively tied only to specific projects. This would enable ECAs to leverage public funds more efficiently, mobilise private capital at scale, and target investments that align with broader economic and policy objectives while effectively supporting exporters beyond a single project (e.g. through shopping lines).

By better aligning the rules on export finance as set out in the Arrangement with the rules on Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the Arrangement could better mobilise private sector expertise and capital in ways that reinforce development

impact without diluting its primary trade function.

We also urge the Participants and OECD members to promote and enhance ongoing discussions with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) to develop a common set of eligibility criteria, categorisation standards and incentive measures, aimed at fostering already existing synergies between ECAs and DFIs/IFIs. This coordination effort will bring the additional benefit of protecting the level playing field and preventing commercial finance being crowded out by more explicit or implicit subsidies, such as blended finance, used by IFIs and DFIs.

Specifically, we call on governments to consider how the Arrangement could better align with the rules on ODA, harmonising definitions and processes, as well as foster greater impact and scale of financing by shifting from a single project angle to corporate wide support.

## **Revise the Arrangement's Common Procedures to Enhance Export Competitiveness**

Additionally, procedural requirements of the Arrangement can slow the response time for matching competitive offers, creating further disadvantages for businesses seeking to compete on the merits of their products and services.

### *Enhancing transparency for non-Arrangement products*

Enhancing transparency for non-Arrangement official finance products would bring tangible value to businesses, as these instruments play an increasing role in cross-border competition. While the Arrangement provides detailed and harmonised reporting for export credits, a significant share of official support now takes place outside its scope. This creates information gaps that make it difficult for

businesses and policymakers to understand the full range of state-backed financing available in international markets, weakening comparability and potentially distorting competitive dynamics.

Greater transparency in this area would ultimately benefit both businesses and the broader system of official finance. For companies, clearer information on available support would improve decision-making, reduce uncertainty in bidding processes, and support fairer competition. For governments, it would strengthen trust in the system by demonstrating that official finance is not being used in opaque or distortive ways. In doing so, a proportionate notification framework would help modernise transparency practices while preserving flexibility and efficiency in the delivery of official support.

Specifically, we call on governments and the OECD to ensure adequate and verifiable transparency on all forms of official finance with priority to (i) tied aid, (ii) export credits, (iii) untied development finance (multilateral and bilateral ODA and non-ODA), (iv) untied investment loans and guarantees and (v) other forms of official finance (e.g. equity investments).

### *Making matching operable in practice*

Furthermore, the provisions for matching the terms of an offer could also be revisited to more effectively respond to business needs in the fast-moving, complex environment in which businesses operate today. While useful in theory, the matching procedures are often ineffective in practice, especially in the case of matching with non-Participants.

A central concern is that international tenders often move fast, and competing offers from non-Arrangement providers can be put forward with little notice. The matching procedures, however, typically require internal assessments and, in some cases, coordination between governments, which can delay a response. For businesses, even small delays can mean losing a contract.

There is also an issue of uncertainty and lack of transparency. Companies do not always have full visibility into the terms offered by competitors, particularly when those offers come from opaque financing systems. In particular, the requirement that “a Participant shall make every reasonable effort [...] to verify that these terms and conditions are officially supported” (Article 24a) appears difficult for businesses to support in practice where terms and conditions may be confidential. This makes it harder to justify and structure a matching request, and creates doubt about whether support will ultimately be approved.

Another challenge is restrictiveness in scope. Matching is generally tied to specific, demonstrated offers and may not fully capture the range of financial advantages competitors provide—such as broader state-backed packages, tied aid elements, or non-standard instruments. As a result, even when matching is permitted, it may not fully level the playing field. The matching mechanism has to be broadened to allow the level playing field also to cover counter proposals with tied aid/blended finance/state-backed investment funds and other forms of (financial) support.

Administrative complexity is also a recurring issue. Businesses must work through multiple layers (exporters, banks, and ECAs) each with their own requirements, to initiate a matching process. This can increase transaction costs and make the tool less accessible, particularly for smaller firms.

Finally, there is a perception of inconsistent application across countries. Different interpretations of what qualifies for matching, or how flexibly rules are applied, can create uneven outcomes for businesses depending on their home jurisdiction.

Ultimately, a quick and reliable matching process needs to be found. Doing so can send a strong signal to non-Participant countries and provide them with an incentive to join, or associate themselves with the Arrangement. In order to ensure the long-term stability and integrity of the Arrangement it will be essential

to find an adequate notification mechanism amongst Participant countries.

### *Enabling a practical and proportionate approach to environmental and social due diligence procedures*

It is important that the Arrangement ensures greater replicability and standardisation in its overall approach, particularly with respect to environmental and social due diligence. A more harmonised framework would reduce fragmentation across ECAs and improve predictability for applicants, while maintaining robust safeguards. In this context, a practical and proportionate process could be considered for corporates and/or technologies that support the green energy transition and are typically associated with lower environmental and social impacts, for example through a pre-screened or categorised approach that streamlines assessment requirements for clearly defined low-risk activities. Such an approach would not diminish due diligence standards, but rather calibrate them to the level of risk involved, ensuring resources are focused where they are most needed. Greater replicability and standardisation would also help accelerate time-to-market and enable support for a larger number of impactful projects. This is particularly important given that institutional resources and specialist

talent within ECAs are finite and already under significant pressure, and therefore must be deployed efficiently in a way that balances rigor with practical delivery capacity. Specifically, we would encourage governments to consider:

- In-depth analysis focused on Category A (the most impactful ones) to concentrate limited resources on higher-impact projects
- Corporate level appraisal as an alternative to project level appraisal for smaller projects, (e.g. below SDR 50 m classified as B or C) to improve access to ECA-backed financing for small and medium-sized exporters and importers
- Mutual reliance and cooperation with other DFIs, ECAs and NPBs
- A risk-based approach that fast-tracks low-risk projects, reducing delays and costs while providing greater market certainty.
- Better alignment of the OECD Common Approaches with the Equator Principles given these standards have been already adopted by several FIs worldwide.
- Wider acceptance of host country standards as benchmarks, recognising that many countries have significantly strengthened their legislation and that these frameworks are often best suited to projects because they are tailored to local conditions.

# ***Business at OECD (BIAC) National Members***

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Austria	<b>IV: Federation of Austrian Industries</b>
Belgium	<b>VBO FEB: Federation of Belgian Enterprises</b>
Canada	<b>Canadian Chamber of Commerce</b>
Chile	<b>CPC: Confederation of Production and Commerce of Chile</b>
Colombia	<b>ANDI: National Business Association of Colombia</b>
Costa Rica	<b>UCCAEP: Costa Rican Union of Chambers and Associations of the Private Business Sector</b>
Costa Rica	<b>CICR: Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica</b>
Czech Republic	<b>SP: Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic</b>
Denmark	<b>DA: Danish Employers' Confederation</b>
Denmark	<b>DI: Confederation of Danish Industry</b>
Estonia	<b>Estonian Employers' Confederation</b>
Finland	<b>EK: Confederation of Finnish Industries</b>
France	<b>MEDEF: Movement of the Enterprises of France</b>
Germany	<b>BDA: Confederation of German Employers' Associations</b>
Germany	<b>BDI: Federation of German Industries</b>
Greece	<b>SEV: Hellenic Federation of Enterprises</b>
Hungary	<b>MGYOSZ: Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists</b>
Hungary	<b>VOSZ: Confederation of Hungarian Business</b>
Iceland	<b>SA: Confederation of Icelandic Enterprise</b>
Ireland	<b>Ibec: Irish Business and Employers Confederation</b>
Israel	<b>MAI: Manufacturers' Association of Israel</b>
Italy	<b>assonime: The Association of Italian Joint Stock Companies</b>
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Italy	<b>FeBAF: Italian Banking Insurance and Finance Federation</b>
Japan	<b>Keidanren: Japan Business Federation</b>
Korea	<b>FKI: Federation of Korean Industries</b>
Latvia	<b>LDDK: Employers' Confederation of Latvia</b>
Lithuania	<b>LPK: Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists</b>
Luxembourg	<b>FEDIL: The Voice of Luxembourg's Industry</b>
Mexico	<b>COPARMEX: Employers Confederation of the Mexican Republic</b>
Netherlands	<b>VNO-NCW: Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers</b>
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Norway	<b>NHO: Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise</b>
Portugal	<b>CIP: Confederation of Portuguese Business</b>
Poland	<b>Polish Confederation Lewiatan</b>
Slovakia	<b>RÚZ: Slovak Employers' Federation</b>
Slovenia	<b>ZDS: Association of Employers of Slovenia</b>
Spain	<b>CEOE: Confederation of Employers and Industries of Spain</b>
Sweden	<b>Svenskt Näringsliv: Confederation of Swedish Enterprise</b>
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Türkiye	<b>TİSK: Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations</b>
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